World leaders have welcomed the historic deal reached between Cuba and US on easing their diplomatic tensions and restrictions as a concerted aim to reverse 50 years of hostility.While the agreement is seen as the major achievement in the diplomatic relations between the two countries it leaves nonetheless a long road ahead to normalise completely the relations and inevitably raise the major question on the embargo’s fate.
US-Cuban relations are frozen since early sixties, becoming the best synonym of Cold War antagonism: US failed attempt at the Bay of Pigs, the near nuclear holocaust in the missile crisis, a long list of failed attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro, Cuban military actions in Africa, support for Latin American guerrillas, the infamous embargo to strangle the regime and its people.
The two presidents, Barak Obama for US and Raul Castro for Cuba, in a contemporary TV speech announced the end of travel restrictions and efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations following more than a year of secret talks in Canada and at the Vatican, directly involving Pope Francis. The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, whose country never broke off ties with Cuba, welcomed what he called an “overdue development”. Pope Francis joined leaders from Latin America and Europe in praising the historic deal.
As part of the deal, US contractor Alan Gross, 65, was released from Cuban prison in return for three Cubans held in the US. President Obama also said the US was looking to open an embassy in Havana in the coming months. In exchange for Alan Gross, who was in poor health, and an unnamed American intelligence officer, Washington released three members of the so-called “Cuban Five” who were serving lengthy sentences for espionage.
In addition, it has also been agreed that the amount of money, which can be sent in remittances, will quadruple from $500 (£320) to $2,000 per quarter. Telecom providers will be allowed to improve Cuba’s infrastructure so that more Cubans can access the internet. Cubans will also be able to import construction materials to build private homes, a move aimed at easing the severe shortage of suitable homes on the island. Travel restrictions to Cuba will be relaxed, making family visits and cross-border humanitarian projects easier.
Reactions: same old, same old
The reactions around the world welcomed in large part the agreement and mark even more, if there any need, the total distance from reality of those opposing the deal.
The European Union, which is in the process of normalising ties with Cuba, described the move as a “historical turning point”. All Latin American countries hailed the announcements as a historic day for the entire subcontinent. Chilean Foreign Minister Heraldo Munoz hailed it as “the beginning of the end of the Cold War in the Americas”. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, whose predecessor Hugo Chavez was a close ally of Fidel Castro, said it was a “moral victory” and “victory for Fidel”.
Former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said increased US engagement in Cuba in the future should “encourage real and lasting reforms for the Cuban people and the other nations of the Americas should join us in this effort”.
However, not everyone applauded the move, with dozens of Cubans living in exile in the US state of Florida protesting after the announcement on Wednesday. Mainly they see this as a betrayal, a unilateral concession to Castro’s regime and accuse Obama of being a traitor. Hardliners within the Republican Party, like Senator Marco Rubio, slammed the deal as “inexplicable”, adding that it did nothing to address the issues of Cuba’s political system and human rights record.
The important community of Cuban bloggers welcomed in large measure the deal, seeing in this a great opportunity for a growth of Cuban civil society and a step forward for political progress.
However, the power to lift the embargo stay within the US congress, dominated by Republicans, and although even the media are calling for a lifting, signalled a shift among US opinion makers for a softening of the US stance on Cuba, it is clear that a long and difficult battle awaits Barak Obama. He is likely to face stiff opposition from representatives from Florida, where many Cuban exiles who fled Castro’s Cuba settled. Florida Senator Marco Rubio promised on CNN to block the nomination of any US ambassador to Cuba and other anti-Castro legislators suggested Congress would remove funding for any normalised ties with the country. However, if it is true that this anti-Castrist block is still powerful and may have also ears in Washington, on the other it would be erroneous thinking to it as a monolithic group. To many analysts, Obama’s move cannot have happened without an assessment on the real positions on the matter within and beyond the Democratic Party, suggesting that President Obama has considerable support in Congress. Cynthia Arnson, director of the Latin America programme at the Wilson Center, says that there are many Republicans who are not resisting this or are neutral. In addition, it was highlighted the fact that the plane that brought Alan Gross back to the US had three members of Congress on board, including Republican Jeff Flake, from Arizona.
But if these were the reactions, mostly expected and understandable, is the the speculation on what it led to this historic rapprochement, what reasons and political calculation is behind the two presidents’ agreement.
US and Cuba Isolation is the Key to the Change
When In December 2013, at Nelson Mandela’s funerals, US President Barack Obama and Raul Castro shake hands in the first such public gesture since 1959, many analysts saw that as something more than a simply diplomatic good etiquette. During the following months, speculation on talks, pressure on embargo lifting in the US and EU media and the question surrounding Alan Gross’ deteriorating health have contributed to further the claims that something was going on between Cuba and US.
The reasons behind the agreement cannot be explained under a simplistic Cold War historic paradigm, instead there are political, economical, strategic and propagandist reasons more suitable to sustain the argument.
For both Cuba and US, the issue of prisoners started to assume a central focus in the dialogue: Alan Gross and his possible death while in detention and the unpopular arrest of the Cuban five where two major embarrassment for both presidents. The deteriorating health of Alan Gross has been behind the rapid overture as his death in a Cuban jail would have been an almost insurmountable obstacle for any possible negotiation. On the other side, this was also the opportunity for Cuba to close the issue surrounding the Cuban five and obtain the release. In few words, both countries had more to lose than to gain in leaving unchanged their positions.
Nevertheless, if this is true that the hostages exchange was the first point of contact and the first reason of starting negotiations, what made these talks evolve into a diplomatic breakthrough is something else.
US: A necessary deal, a potential Trojan horse
President Obama on his TV speech said the “rigid and outdated policy” of isolating Cuba had clearly failed and that it was time for a new approach. He defended the US policy as justified at the time but counterproductive on the long term, failing to achieve the supposed target. The reasoning under a Cold War paradigm, that Cuban communism could infect US or spill to other countries in not believable anymore and died 24 years ago. Recent political development in Latin America have nothing to do with Cuba or its revolution, the “turn to left”, more or less radical, has been obtained through the legal democratic electoral process and not with an armed revolution. Even considering the Zapatista’s Chiapas, the only real recent uprising under a guerrilla strategy, its results created more uneasiness in the Mexican government rather than in the US.
US and Obama’s administration had other reasons for this change: political (Latin America rapprochement, worldview of US role, electoral strategy), economic (review on embargo’s effects, growing competition), strategic (set a foot back in Latin America, counterbalance of powers, change of regime policy).
Obama’s administration had to revert its policy on Latin America that became synonym of disinterest and distrust. The turn to the left of several countries, the open opposition of Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, the ambiguities of the Plan Colombia, their silence on the Falklands/Malvinas have further isolated and weakened the US. By reaching an agreement on Cuba, the US can start not only a dialogue with Raul Castro but also with the leftist governments of the subcontinent, change its image from a country opposed to independent political will to a country now ready to sat at a table and negotiate at the same level.
The Cuba’s agreement is also a necessary condition to change on the world scenario what is perceived as a “double standard” or hypocrite figure: promoting democracy where is convenient and blocking it where US interests are at stake. Including Cuba on the states sponsoring terror while keeping an eye shut on the repression in Egypt post Mubarak, appeasing the brutal military intervention, is a major embarrassment for example. The US have no problem in discussing with China and have normal relations, although their poor score on human rights, or recently the re-approaching with Iran in anti ISIS efforts just show how unbalanced and discredited is their policy: hailed in the Western allied government, despised by all the developing countries.
Finally, there is a purely internal political dimension. While Obama will not stand for the next presidential election, and seen the recent humiliating defeat in the Congress dominated by Republicans, the Democrats will have to find a good strategy to recover. CIA scandals, accuses of racism within police forces are used by Republicans to distance the minority groups from their usual electoral recipient. This deal, if on a side may anger Florida’s Cuban community, on the other it is also true that the Latino community as a whole welcome the move and may have effects on electoral polls.
Considering President Obama own strategy, he has been accused from all fronts in this second term: Republicans attack him for being too soft against Russia, Syria, Iran and North Korea, many Americans for being unable to sort arms controls, speed up reforms, control of terrorism and lately racism on police forces. This deal inevitably put a new light on his administration, as being the first American president to actually do something real for addressing this remnant of Cold War history. He may not be able to lift the embargo straight away but by opening the debate inevitably put the responsibility of the failure on the opposition and on the Cuban Government. If successful, he will make history and the Democrats will surely benefit.
On the economic sphere, the approach is to review in the long term the relations with Cuba aiming at end of the embargo. Its continuation is not only a heresy for trade market and capitalistic system on which the US is found, but it is also a loss of investments in an island that could offer the US incredible revenues. The risk of isolating itself is to give to competitors an advantage that will be impossible to recover when the embargo will be lifted. In addition, while the US cannot trade, others are already doing it or plan to do, with the risk also to have at the doorstep powers that are certainly not US friendly such China and worst of all Russia. Dialogue and embargo lifting will also undermine the role of regional powers like Venezuela that is the major partner and economic supporter of Cuba.
This inevitably opens the strategic scenario. The US 21st century policy is inevitably looking at the Pacific to contain the rising of China’s military might, but in the immediate Russia is the major obstacle and Cuba could be seen as dangerously needed by Moscow to thwart US interests. The strategy could be this time to pull Cuba on US side by reaching a deal and avoid pushing it towards Russia. By setting a friendlier relation with Cuba and assuring a sort of barrier against possible enemies, will allow Washington to reset its Latin American relations and damage the radical block represented by Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. This is the reason why Cubans and all other traditional US antagonists while welcoming deal, on the other are also conscious that the “change of regime policy” may be hidden somewhere. The Cuban regime therefore will surely continue to keep an eye on the communication agreement to avoid that this will be a Trojan horse to fuelling unrest.
Cuba: an unexpected diplomatic window to keep open with prudence
President Raul Castro gave his speech at the same time as President Obama announcing to Cubans this historic deal. He delivered his speech in a sober manner, with none of the triumphalist notes one could have expected on the day when a US president announced a major shift in relations with the “Communist-monster”. He mentioned his brother Fidel Castro a number of times, implying not only that the talks had been given the approval of the leader but also as confirmation that the Lider Maximo has been part of it indirectly.
However, Cuba like the US is also at a crossroad. Politically Cuba has to break the isolation and any US pretext for further sanctions or worst a change of regime. The recent changes in the Latin American political scenario have strengthened Cuba’s position, with all countries more or less in favour for an end of the embargo. Politically, as said the hostages issue has surely helped Cuba in negotiating with the US, but as per Obama political calculation in Havana is not a coincidence. Castro knows perfectly that a probable next republican government will not only block any Cuban effort to rediscuss the embargo but also its hostility can even mean a direct attempt for a change of regime. The time is also right for Raul Castro to change his image from being simply Fidel’s brother and achieve a status of his own, a real president, that exact like Obama has for many been subject of critics.
Exactly as per the US, in reality many of the reasons that may explain the willingness of Cuba to discuss are also strategic. Venezuela, due to falling oil prices is in economic decline, its support is not as strong as it used to be and without this source the already fragile Cuban economy will surely reach the bottom. In addition, Venezuela itself is subject of US sanctions and desire for a change of regime, which Cuba consider to be only a matter of time before the US will turn to Cuba again. Nevertheless, the paradox is that exactly the US double standard policy combined to the counterproductive stance with Russia has in reality opened a diplomatic space for Cuba to move. Russia is an immediate and present danger for US policy in the world, and Cuba may be seen as an attractive tool in Moscow for the tit-for-tat Cold War policy style: if the US are playing near the Russian border, so can do Russia with Venezuela and Cuba. But Cuba is probably also playing its cards in avoiding to get embroiled into the renewed US-Russia competition, and instead using this as an opportunity to obtain the maximum from both. A sort of neutrality which will be very welcome in Washington. Strategically speaking, on the embargo matter, the US are isolated in keeping a non sense blockade generating suffering on people, while from UN to EU, from Latin America to Pope Francis the calls are increasing for the end of this historical failure.
The US-Cuban deal is a start of a long road to close 50 years of distrust, hatred and isolation. While the short term goal is for both to dialogue and reopen a communication channel, on the long term is the embargo issue that may be the real challenge. No negotiation will be successful without addressing the embargo lifting and promoting a free Cuban trade, but on the other both countries are required to make further steps by abandoning the Cold War mindset and not using this renewed opportunity to unbalance the adversary. Unfortunately, recent political developments give less hope that powers will act sensibly or a far from echoes of world dominance and control. The embargo could be difficult to end and may be thicker than the Berlin Wall, but keeping it alive will make this world less safe and a dangerous weapon to revert to a division that was thought to have been relegated to history books a quarter of a century ago.
Latin America’s turmoil, political crisis, and unrest have found the best example in the never-ending Colombian conflict. While the rest of the subcontinent assisted in recent years to economic growth, political change and to a positive future outlook, on the other Colombia still struggle to achieve stability, security for its population and the end of the civil conflict that is now on for 50 years.
Recently Colombia returned to the main news following the kidnapping of an army general by the Farc, then released after government negotiations. Nevertheless, this reopens the debate on the conflict and on the effectiveness of the latest peace plan launched in La Havana in 2012.
Colombia, in common with other Latin American nations, experienced a revolutionary movement fuelled by the inequality, segregation and poverty that ravaged these societies especially in the fifties and sixties. Following the Cuban revolution and the rise of Marxist movements across the continent, in 1964 a group of Marxist revolutionaries including Manuel Marulanda founded the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia Farc, followed by the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, ELN.
These movements for decades fought under the common framework of a socialist revolution within the traditional guerrilla’s praxis, obtaining control of vast areas of the country, and even establishing popular support. Nevertheless, especially in the 80’s and 90’s, when the revolutionary furore declined and popular support decrease, the conflict started to change from a traditional Marxist revolutionary struggle against the state into a war where soon other protagonists joined: drug cartels, paramilitaries and other criminal gangs.
In a country where the presence of the state has always been weak, the result has been a war on multiple fronts, with the civilian population caught in the crossfire and often deliberately targeted for collaborating with one side or the other. Human rights advocates blamed paramilitaries for massacres, disappearances, cases of torture and forced displacement while rebel groups are behind assassinations, kidnapping and extortion. The governments have not always acted in a clear and legal way, often been colluded with paramilitary groups and repressing civil organisations.
Some attempts to reach a solution have been made along the years, although have all failed for various reasons. The only successful precedent was the M-19 guerrilla’s demobilisation in March 1990 under President Virgilio Barco. Despite the assassination of its presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro, in April that year, the M-19 party came third in the presidential elections and many former M-19 rebels also helped to draft the current constitution. In 2011, former M-19 member, Gustavo Petro, was elected mayor of the Colombian capital, Bogota, considered the country’s second most important elected post.
Different story is for the peace talks; the first agreed ceasefire was signed by the government of Belisario Betancourt and Farc in 1984, but collapsed two years later when 22 rebels are killed by the military and the rebels retaliate with an ambush on soldiers. Another attempt was made in 1991 with peace talks held in neighbouring Venezuela and later moved to Tlaxcala, Mexico, where they failed in 1992. Between 1992-1998 Farc are at their strongest in numbers, area occupied and military capability when they kidnap about 200 members of the police and military. This paved the way for the third peace accord attempt made in 1998 by the government of Andres Pastrana, which agreed to grant the rebels a safe haven the size of Switzerland. This has been widely regarded by many analysts as a serious mistake: by 2002 Farc rebels have been able to reorganise and use the safe haven to import arms, export drugs and build up its military strength. The talks came to an abrupt end after the rebels hijacked a plane in February 2002 and kidnapped Senator Jorge Gechem. Three days later, the rebels also seized presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. The peace process was widely seen as a complete failure and led many Colombians to believe that no dialogue was possible with the rebels.
However, successful was at least the demobilisation of the right-wing paramilitaries, with roots in vigilante groups set up decades ago by landowners for protection against rebels. The main group was the AUC ,Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, which officially has demobilised in 2003, leading to at least 31,000 paramilitaries handing in their weapons under a peace deal. Nevertheless, that plan opened a scar that it is ultimately becoming the main point of attrition in the recent talks between government, rebels and the public opinion. In 2005, a controversial law was passed that made paramilitary fighters eligible for reduced jail terms, of no more than eight years, if they gave details of their involvement in torture, killings and other crimes. Critics argued that paramilitaries guilty of serious human rights violations could end up serving only reduced jail terms. This opened up a series of accusation of complicity between government and paramilitaries to divert the plan and favour a lenient approach. Eventually, the extent of the paramilitaries’ influence over local, regional and national politics came to the light in 2007 in a scandal dubbed the “parapoliticos”, where members of congress were jailed and dozens more politicians investigated for links to the AUC.
In this high and lows of previous attempts, signs of a change start to appear that led inevitably to the recent talks. The rebels started to lose power and, although Farc is still Colombia’s largest guerrilla group and one of the world’s richest rebel movements, according to the Colombian military there are now some 8,000 fighters, down from 16,000 in 2001. The rebels, who a decade ago controlled nearly a third of Colombian territory, now mostly operate in remote rural areas or through hit-and-run attacks. Several Farc commanders have been killed or captured in the last few years: in 2008 senior rebel leader Raul Reyes is killed in a bombing raid and Farc founder Manuel Marulanda dies of natural causes. Nevertheless, the rebels are by no means defeated and have demonstrated great capacity to adapt. The second largest rebel group, ELN, has also saw its numbers almost halved in the last 10 years, announcing that it is willing to enter into peace talks shortly after the negotiations between the government and the Farc began. The government itself, lead now by Santos consider the solely military option as unviable and counterproductive.
Sources from the Unit for Attention and Reparation of Victims of the Colombian government estimates that 50 years of conflict have killed at least 220,000, more than five million are internally displaced, 6.2 million registered as victims.
The Peace Talks: Could This be the Right Time?
The past failures inevitably favoured the hard liners within the government who found a voice in the former President Alvaro Uribe, in office from 2006 to 2010. Uribe pursued a hard-line stance against left-wing guerrillas while making tentative of peace overtures. This period saw military action against the rebels as a pre-condition to force them to the table of negotiations. Nevertheless, even this strategy did not work out and his successor, Juan Manuel Santos, took office in 2010 vowing to seek an end to the conflict. In October 2012, the government and the biggest rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc), launched peace talks.
President Juan Manuel Santos confirmed that initial informal discussions with the Farc started shortly after he took office in August 2010 and then developed into direct exploratory talks with the rebels’ representatives in the Cuban capital, Havana, in February 2012. These discussions concluded with the signing of an agreement that set out a six-point agenda for the formal negotiations which were launched in Oslo in October 2012 and began in Havana the following month.
President Santos made it clear from the beginning that military operations against the Farc will continue until a final deal has been reached, marking a difference with previous peace processes where ceasefire and safe haven were agreed, which many believe were used by the rebels mainly to regroup and strengthen. At the same time, the decision to continue with the military operations has also tested the Farc’s real intention to negotiate and reach a deal. The rebels’ decision to continue contacts even after government forces killed Alfonso Cano, the rebel leader who started the negotiations, in November 2011, has been presented as proof of their willingness to secure a deal. In addition, Farc announced that they would stop their policy of kidnapping people in order to show goodwill although after the recent seizing of an army general in November 2014 they clarified that that policy applied only to civilians. Farc also continued its attacks on military targets, seen as a measured response for government stance against a ceasefire.
The agenda approved in the negotiations covers six issues:
- Land reform
- Political participation of rebels
- Drug trafficking
- Rights of victims
- Disarmament of the rebels
- The implementation of the peace deal.
Scepticism, political hijacking, memories of failure and real hopes
Currently the real significance and effects of this plan is under discussion and subject to different interpretations. Negotiators in the Cuban capital have reached agreements on agrarian reform, political participation for Farc and how to jointly fight the illegal drug trade. The land reform, which they said would result in a radical transformation of rural Colombia, provides for the creation of a land bank to reallocate land, especially that which was seized illegally during the decades of conflict.
In November 2013, the two sides agreed on a political future for the rebels, should a peace deal be reached. This included guarantees, conditions and support for the creation of new political parties, a sort of revival of the M-19 plan.
In May 2014, the two sides agreed on a plan to deal with the illegal drug trade. The Farc, which controls large patches of rural Colombia, is believed to be partly funded by money generated by the illegal drug trade.
In June 2014, Farc and government negotiators in Havana announced they would set up a truth commission to investigate the deaths and human rights violations during five decades of conflict. This follows decades of legal battles by relatives of kidnapped Colombian soldiers demanding justice for them.
Although the pace has not been as fast as declared, many regard this plan as more realistic if compared to past attempts. At least 4 out of 6 points of the agenda has seen an agreement, never in the past talks have gone such distance and Farc for the first time is not advancing requests for a radical transformation of Colombia’s political and economic structure. Numerous opinion polls in recent months have suggested that a large majority back dialogue hoping to see an end of the conflict, but just over half say they are optimistic about the outcome mainly due to previous negative experiences and recent developments.
Detractors argue that the negotiators have left the most difficult issues at last, namely how Farc will lay down its arms and whether commanders will face prosecution for atrocities. Thousands of people have joined protests in Colombia against a possible amnesty for Farc rebels as part of a peace process. As it happened during the AUC demobilisation, common Colombians and relatives of victims fear that a lenient process will undermine the quest for justice leaving open scars that inevitably could resurface even if a peace is achieved. In addition, the issue is also exploited for political gains by different antagonists of President Santos. Many of the marchers were supporters of former President Alvaro Uribe, and the rallies in several cities across the country were organised by the Colombia Quiere movement backed by his Centro Democratic Party.
Uribe calls on the army to support the protests by fighting and defeating the guerrillas, saying that this is the only way to avoid the country being delivered to terrorism. Uribe and his allies have argued that the Farc should answer for killings, kidnapping and drug trafficking; they have also accused President Santos of overlooking rebel atrocities in order to drive through the peace process and gain electoral visibility.
Nevertheless, this request for army involvement is not only part of Uribe’s belief but also a response for what Colombians perceive as deteriorated security. While Colombians welcome the process that could lead ultimately to the demobilisation of rebels, on the other there is fear that the void of power will be filled by common criminals and drug cartels. One of the factor alimenting this opinion is the emergence of what the government calls Bacrims, namely criminal bands, which are involved in drug trafficking and extortion. These groups emerged after the demobilisation of the AUC paramilitaries in 2006. Although violent crime and kidnappings related to guerrillas and government have decreased in recent years, is the cocaine trade that has been the main motor of the recent violence and fear. The eastern border area has seen a growth in criminal gangs which smuggle subsidised goods and drugs between Venezuela to Colombia. The fear is that following a peace accord many rebels may join illegal activities or gangs may exploit the absence of the state institutions in ex guerrilla’s strongholds. On the other hand a peace accord, with the shift of resources away from battling the rebels and towards fighting common crime, could increase citizens’ safety. Particular importance, as part of the peace process, will assume the task on how to include ex fighters into the new life whether by joining military services or community groups, as to strengthen the democratic process. Criminal gangs often attack civic and community groups seen as a challenge to their authority.
Another point of concern is that even if the government signs a peace deal with the Farc, it will still have to deal with Colombia’s second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN). President Santos made clear to ELN that he wanted to see actions rather than words and demanded the 3,000-strong rebel force to release the hostages it still holds, and stop its attacks on civilians and the security forces before the government would engage in negotiations. On 28 August 2013, a day after the rebels released a Canadian mining executive they had held hostage, President Santos announced to be ready to talk to the guerrilla group as soon as possible. In June 2014, the government and the ELN announced in a joint statement that they had been holding exploratory peace talks since January and had agreed on some points of an agenda to discuss in formal talks.
Effects on the economy
President Santos has predicted that peace will add at least 2% annually to the already booming economic growth. While Colombia’s economy has been growing at a rate of about 4% in the past decade, analysts say that growth could have been doubled if it had not been for the armed conflict.
But Colombia, as per other Latin American economies, has still unresolved issues. Unemployment continues to be a major problem, which in 2011 was the highest in the whole of Latin America. Although the government announced last May that the unemployment rate had dropped to its lowest level in 14 years, at 8.8% it remains almost double that of neighbouring Ecuador. According to 2012 World Bank figures, Colombia is the seventh most unequal country in the world, with inequality levels similar to those found in Haiti and Angola. In addition there will be the cost of reconstruction which the peace commission in the Colombian senate recently put at $45bn (£28bn) over the next decade. Major investments are needed in areas such as land distribution, infrastructure and industry, as well as in local government and agriculture, if peace was to be achieved in areas which for a long time have been neglected by the state. In addition, while poverty levels have dropped from 47.7% in 2003 to 32.7% in 2012, income inequality, which fuels social tension, has remained virtually unchanged. The countryside has suffered most from the presence of the guerrilla, with a lack of investment in infrastructure and education, with poverty levels well above 50% according to Colombia’s national statistics office.
However, the peace agreement could start reverting this deficit and redirect resources in rebuilding the economy which will benefit from investments and renewed confidence in the market once stability has been achieved. A peace accord would create a context for sectors of Colombian society who still view each other with distrust, such as unions, businesses, and the security forces, to start working together. A peace deal would also allow more space for leftist social movements too often stigmatised as guerrilla supporters and to express their concerns about the key problems affecting Colombian society. The possible transformation of rebels groups into political parties could not only offer an alternative to address social problems in Colombia but also may see Colombia joining the “turn to the left” and the socialist revival that has been successful in recent years in other countries without resorting to arms.
The International Scenario
Colombia civil war and its effect, finally, cannot be considered only as an internal matter. The effects and the possible consequences will have undoubtedly repercussions in other Latin American countries and beyond. The guerrillas role and the government military actions backed by the US has created tensions with neighbouring Ecuador and Venezuela, that consider the Plan Colombia sponsored by Washington an attempt to militarise the subcontinent and cover actions aimed at destabilize these countries. While the common Marxist and socialist ideology my explain the support that Farc and ELN have received by the leftist government of Ecuador and the Bolivarian revolution, especially during Chavez presidency, it is mainly the US paranoia with this experiments spreading to other countries that led to consider a support to Colombia not only as a purely matter against drug trafficking.
The US played an ambiguous role on the subject. It is true that more than 90% of all cocaine on American streets comes from Colombia directly or indirectly, and the US administration was keen to tackle the supply at source. Since 2000, Washington has spent several billion dollars on training and equipping Colombian forces, and providing intelligence to help tackle drug traffickers and eliminate coca crops. But Human rights groups, rebels and civil organisations say the Plan Colombia in reality was a disguise to assist Uribe in his military campaign against rebels whilst not taking care of paramilitaries or disbanded group trafficking in drugs. Actions by Colombian army has led to border tensions culminated on several occasion to a near declaration of war especially with Venezuela, accused by Bogota to support and funding the rebels, while Chavez accused the government of staging actions aimed with US support to destabilize the Venezuelan government. The fact that drug trafficking is assuming an international dimension is also testified by the effect on Mexico that is struggling to contain the drug cartels. For many analysts there is a link between the rise of Mexican cartels and the deteriorated security in Colombian areas known to be the haven of trafficking.
The peace plan if it will work out will need to address not only how to decommission Farc and Eln but also to make sure that their areas of operation will not fall under the control of local criminal gangs, drug cartels or foreign criminal organisation. The Plan Colombia under this danger may assume a total different significance as all the parties involved will benefit by tackling the issue at source. The only problem will be to ensure that strategic and geopolitical calculations will not interfere within this framework and it is just on this where the leftist governments of South America have more than one concern looking at recent developments.
The recent anniversary for the fall of Berlin Wall, united with the increased tensions between Unites States and Russia have brought to attention the Cold War in both the memory of what it used to be and what it can be in the near future. If the official Cold War ended from the wall disappearance, it is also true that not everything was confined to the past and some remnants of that era survived and maybe could be at the centre of a renewed version of that tension. If the Warsaw Pact was dismantled thus paving the way and hopes (soon disillusioned) of a more peaceful world, on the other NATO did not cease to exist continuing in its controversial role as a western military umbrella. But it is another heredity of the Cold War years that is increasingly generating attention and discomfort in the West and even in the US: the Cuban embargo.
Since the collapsed of the Soviet Union, the Cuban embargo, which limits American businesses from conducting business with Cuban interests, is still in effect and is the most enduring trade embargo in modern history.
El Bloqueo: Origin and Consequences
The United States embargo against Cuba, known also as el bloqueo, is a commercial, economic, and financial embargo imposed on Cuba on 19 October 1960. Currently, the Cuban embargo is enforced mainly with six statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Cuba Assets Control Regulations of 1963, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Helms–Burton Act of 1996, and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.
All these acts introduced further restrictions to the existing embargo of which the most important are:
- The Cuban Democracy Act, signed into law in 1992, with the stated purpose of maintaining sanctions on Cuba so long as the Cuban government refuses to move toward “democratization and greater respect for human rights”.
- The Helms–Burton Act, passed by Congress in 1996, which further restricted US citizens from doing business in or with Cuba, and mandated restrictions on giving public or private assistance to any successor government in Havana unless and until certain claims against the Cuban government are met.
Despite the nature of the embargo, the US blocked physically the island with a naval action only during the Missile Crisis on 1962. In fact the US does not block Cuba’s trade with third-party countries which are not under their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, many points at the fact that in an unbalanced alliance where the US are clearly the major market and a strong player and influencers, foreign countries that trade with Cuba could be penalised in which has been condemned as an “extraterritorial” measure that contravenes the sovereign equality of States, and freedom of trade. Cuba on the other end can, and does, conduct international trade with many third-party countries and it has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that the embargo costs the U.S. economy $1.2 billion per year in lost sales and exports, while the Cuban government estimates that the embargo costs the island itself $685 million annually. The self-proclaimed non-partisan Cuba Policy Foundation estimates that the embargo costs the U.S. economy $3.6 billion per year in economic output.
The embargo has been criticized for its effects on food, clean water, medicine, and other economic needs of the Cuban population. Criticism has come from the Cuban government, citizens and groups within Cuba, international organizations and leaders including Barack Obama. Some academic critics, outside Cuba, have also linked the embargo to shortages of medical supplies which have resulted in a series to epidemics of specific diseases, including neurological disorders and blindness caused by poor nutrition. George P. Shultz, who served as Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan, calls the continued embargo “insane”. Some American business leaders openly call for an end to the embargo as, they argue, as long as the embargo continues, US business cannot benefit from market restrictions especially against those countries that actually trade with Cuba. Some religious leaders oppose the embargo for a variety of reasons, including humanitarian and economic hardships that imposes on Cubans. In 2010 seventy-four of Cuba’s dissidents signed a letter to the United States Congress in support of a bill that would lift the U.S. travel ban for Americans wishing to visit Cuba. The signers include blogger Yoani Sanchez and hunger striker Guillermo Farinas, as well as Elizardo Sanchez, head of Cuba’s most prominent human rights group and Miriam Levi, who helped found the Damas de Blanco, or Ladies in White, a group of wives and mothers of jailed dissidents.
A 2008 USA Today/Gallup Poll indicated that Americans believe that diplomatic relations “should” be re-established with Cuba, 61% in favour, 31% opposed. In 2009, U.S. Polling indicates that the American public is currently in favor of ending the embargo, 51% against 36%. In January 2012, an Angus Reid Public Opinion poll showed 57% of Americans calling for the end of the travel ban that prevents most Americans from visiting Cuba, with only 27% disagreeing.
After taking office, the current US President Barack Obama outlined a series of steps that Cuba could take to demonstrate a willingness to open its society, including releasing political prisoners, allowing United States telecommunications companies to operate on the island and ending government fees on U.S. dollars sent by relatives in the United States. President Obama stated that, without improved human rights and freedoms by Cuba, the embargo remains, U.S.–Cuba relations stay frozen and Cuba also remains one of the four countries (Iran, Sudan, and Syria) in the world designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism by the United States Department of State. Nevertheless, President Barack Obama also introduce some changes as easing the travel ban, allowing Cuban-Americans, students and religious missionaries to travel to Cuba if they meet certain restrictions. Beyond Cuba’s human rights violations and its “state sponsored terrorism” designation, the United States claims $6 billion against the Cuban government.
The Last brick of the Berlin Wall or the first brick of a new one?
Born as a reprisal for Cuba’s alignment with the Soviet Union, the embargo was defined also as a sort of cordon sanitaire against communism spreading to the rest of Latin America and as a warning to other countries. All NATO members observed the embargo quite strictly during the Cold War, but since its end its existence started to create uneasiness even in the US allies.
US still support the embargo even though the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Warsaw Pact has been dismantled and thus disappearing any sort of threat to US security. The idea of claiming that Cuba in itself could pose a threat to US stability is as unrealistic as unjustified, especially when compared to more aggressive countries such North Korea or Iran. Although it is true that Cuba maintained an efficient military apparatus, that proved to be quite strong during the Cold War, it is now clearly on a position to self defence and cannot be a match to the military might of Washington. Cuba does not interfere in other Latin American countries policies nor tries to overthrow any government. Nevertheless, Cuba was included by the Bush administration into the “axis of evil” that, even among US allies, generated perplexities and questions whether this was a farce.
One of the main reasons advocated by US for keeping the embargo is Cuba’s poor performance on freedom and democracy, although other countries that do not score better than Cuba, like China, have political and trading relations with the US. For many the embargo is a bitter revenge for daring an independent action and is judged also a sort of cowardly attack on a country clearly incapable to stand the challenge. On the other hand many questions that the same reasons that led to the Cuban embargo forty years ago are not dissimilar from the recent experiences in Venezuela or in Bolivia, therefore highlighting that the rules of the Cold War do not apply anymore.
Whilst President Obama and the Democratic Party are possibly open to a discussion if there is willingness in La Havana, the republicans on the other that count on the electoral support of Cuban dissident in Florida, are more cautious or even hostile to an end of the embargo. For these irreducible lifting the embargo would be considered a sign of weakness especially under the current international scenario.
The problem is that the risks associated with the status quo are probably more dangerous than the prospect of an end of the embargo.
On foreign policy the main risks associated could be the “hijack” of the Cuban issue for a new Cold War scenario, possibly now developing. Russia may find a renewed interest in supporting again Cuba to undermine US strategy. On the other side, fuelling the tensions and leaving the embargo in place could well be the pretext to keep it in place for the irreducible in Washington.
US will also face scepticism in their mission for world’s democratic change whilst blocking Cuba and still having relations with some countries that have questionable regimes, such in Middle East, China or Iran.
The main risk is therefore associated with a real prospect of isolation and allies leaders keeping distance. Washington could find itself isolated in maintaining a blockade that no one respects, undermining also the ability to fulfil the political targets on the international scenario. The UN General Assembly has, since 1992, passed a resolution every year condemning the ongoing impact of the embargo and declaring it to be in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Israel is the only country that routinely joins the U.S. in voting against the resolution as has Palau every year from 2004 to 2008. On October 26, 2010, for the 19th time, the General Assembly condemned the embargo, 187 to 2 with 3 abstentions. Israel sided with the U.S., while Marshall Islands, Palau and Micronesia abstained.
Human rights groups including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights have also been critical of the embargo.
Under a financial and economical prospect, the blockade could facilitate the introduction of other competitors in a market closed to US businesses, putting them in a clear disadvantage once the blockade would be lifted. The US have lost a good side of business in all these decades and if at first the soviet motif was a powerful mantra to justify a clear economic loss, today, and with an increasing number of countries now trading with Cuba, is like a “shoot to own foot”. The risks associated with this blockade are also to push Cuba towards countries like China and even Russia that can find in the Caribbean an easy way to counterbalance US policies.
Another risk is associated to the possible meltdown of the Cuban regime. We have already witnessed regimes collapsing with consequent humanitarian and security disasters. Cuba for its vicinity to US borders could pose a grave risk to security in the event of a sudden collapse of institutions without a proper transition. The embargo could facilitate that collapse whilst an end could offer the Cuban leadership the possibility to open and prepare the reforms needed.
While Russia and United States fight on different terrain, only at word for the moment, that ranges from Middle East to Eastern Europe, and tensions are reaching the Pacific where the US are reshuffling their forces to counter Chinese growth, the risk of a new cold war is far from being impossible. The hope of an era of peace and coexistence has been destroyed after years of ethnic conflicts in the ex Yugoslavia, adventurous military actions to counter terrorism and the recent failed Arab spring dictated from western stereotypes that led to a decreasing security and the raising of Isis from the darkest depths of human brutality.
Of the remnants of the Cold War, the Cuban embargo still survives as a reminder of a dark era, nuclear annihilation and mistrust that today everyone is remembering but not realising that the wall is still in our minds and life, waiting to be erected and reinforced. The end of the embargo is not only the end of an unjust and historic failure but also the opportunity to destroy once and for all the last wall before another one will be built.
Latin America is assisting to a rapid economic growth and hopes for the future have never been as positive as in recent years. All economies have experience rapid growth with GDP over 5%, at least until the 2008 downturn that has inevitably hit economies still over dependent from US import/export. Nevertheless, the rises of Chile, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina have been hailed as the most positive signals in world economic trends since 2000 and results were obtained with a mix of policies not always made from a strong capitalist background. However, if some countries like Chile continued in their growth, others have started to slow down due not only to world recession but also to internal political problems. Venezuela descending trend was accentuated by Chavez death and a succession that started to show some cracks in the once strong and united Socialist Party’s support, but it is certainly the two main giants of the subcontinent that attracted the attention of the economists: Brazil and Argentina.
Brazil: A Future Superpower with Explosive Social Contradictions
In Brazil presidential elections are expected on 5 October and after the spotlight of the recent football world cup, Brazilians will have now a serious ground to challenge the political establishment. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, who is running for re-election under the Workers’ Party, will have to conduct her campaign amid the official news that Brazil had fallen into a recession earlier this year. The economy of South America’s largest country shrank by 0.6% in the second quarter of this year and by 0.2% in the first. Analysts are projecting Brazil’s growth to be less than 1% in 2014 while inflation is on the rise. In 2010, when Ms Rousseff was first voted into office for the Workers’ Party, the economy was growing at 7.5%, attracting positive headlines both at home and abroad. However, support for the government started to fall after millions of Brazilians took to the streets last year amid a wide range of grievances, ranging from the rising costs of public transport to police violence and the expenses associated with this year’s World Cup. If the football competition, for a moment, helped the government in keeping Brazilians distracted it is now clear that the struggle cannot be postponed any longer. The opposition, tired of years of leftist policies, although successful, is now riding the popular discontent for increased prices and unemployment accusing what they called an “excessive state interventionism” in economy and a lack of reforms to help business flourish independently. The government blames a less favorable international environment for the slowdown and claims that a wave of unjustified pessimism has inhibited investments.
The Workers’ Party has been in power since 2003, following the election of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, popularly known as Lula, as President in October 2002. Lula, a former shoeshine worker, heads Brazil’s first left-wing government for more than 40 years with the promise to challenge poverty and for the first time to rule for the poorest while assisting to an unprecedented economic growth that put Brazil into the rising economies of the 21st century.
Brazil’s natural resources, particularly iron ore, are highly prized by major manufacturing nations, including China. Thanks to the development of offshore fields, the nation has become self-sufficient in oil, ending decades of dependence on foreign producers. The spectacular growth even led Brazil to launch its first space rocket in October 2004, officially including Brazil within the space élite. Nevertheless, the oil richness has not come without compromises and the rights to explore Brazil’s biggest oilfield are awarded to a consortium led by the state-run energy giant Petrobas backed by French, Anglo-Dutch and Chinese firms. Critics say that allowing foreign companies a stake in the oilfield will damage national interests and within the party’s hardliners this has been seen as a concession to those same capitalist enemies fought for decades. But the new resources helped Lula and the government in launching social programmes, continued by his successor Dilma Rousseff, that allowed millions of Brazilians to be lifted out of poverty. These included a variety of policies such increases in the minimum wage, social programmes such as Bolsa Familia, which encourage school attendance and vaccinations in exchange for income support. Brazil’s Aids programme has become a model for other developing countries: it has stabilized the rate of HIV infection and the number of Aids-related deaths has fallen. Brazil has bypassed the major drugs firms to produce cheaper, generic Aids medicines. The government has also launched Brazil Sem Miseria (Brazil Without Poverty) welfare scheme, aimed at lifting millions out of extreme poverty, and in August 2012 the parliament approved a law for universities that requires them to reserve fifty percent of their places for public school students, and increases the number of spaces allotted to black, mixed-race and indigenous students.
Campaigns to improve the life conditions in the Amazon forest and the most remote areas of the country generated initially wide support to the Workers’ Party. The exploitation of the Amazon rainforest has been a major international worry, as it is also an important reservoir of plant and animal life. Deforestation has been slowed down by extra policing and pressure from environmental and consumer groups. The government has fined illegal cattle ranchers and loggers, while the food industries have banned products from illegally deforested areas, such as soya beans and beef. Officials estimate that deforestation in 2010 fell to 5,000 sq km for the year, down from 7,000 sq km the year before and a peak of 27,000 sq km in 2004. Nevertheless, it has not always been a smooth sailing: pressure from poor peasants for land, struggle against slavery that it is still common in some remote areas and the need to sustain a rapid development have created uneasiness. Ranchers reacted sometimes violently, as in November 2011 when Brazil indigenous Guarani leader Nisio Gomes was shot dead in western Brazil. He was part of a Guarani Kaiowa group that had returned to their ancestral land after being evicted by ranchers. Farms lobby criticized the government’s law in forest protection and forced tree replanting in illegally cleared lands, leading even to resignation within the party from the environment minister Marina Silva, who is today the main rival candidate for President Rousseff.
Brazil’s spectacular growth, combining a strong policy to develop the immense resources and the necessity to tackle the poverty and inequality that weighs down the country, nevertheless opened difficult scenarios for the party. The economic growth did not solve Brazil’s problems and although nobody can deny the huge progresses registered especially for the poorest sector of the population, there is still a wide gap between rich and poor. Two are the main areas of social conflict in the country: in the countryside, where much of the arable land is controlled by a handful of wealthy families, a situation which the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST) demand land redistribution, and in the big cities like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo where harsh social conditions are responsible for a third of the population living in favelas or slums.
Unfortunately for the government one of the counter effects of the cities widespread poverty is the rising of violence and drug trafficking which put the political leaders between two major problems: gangs violence on one side and police brutality on the other. In March 2005 a Death squad kills at least 30 people on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro, the city’s worst massacre in over a decade; in May 2006 scores of people are killed in gang attacks and a police brutal response in Sao Paulo state; in June 2011 Security forces occupy one of the biggest slums in Rio de Janeiro, as part of a major crackdown on organized crime ahead of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.
The discontent generated by rising prices and the excessive spending to host the Fifa World Cup and the Olympic Games In Rio de Janeiro in 2016 have also been fuelled by the accusations that after Lula the party is losing its original soul, with corruption scandals filling the press news. Although the first corruption scandal emerged during Lula presidency in 2005, the fast action from the president announcing a wave of resignation within the party ranks and his televised apology reassured Brazilians of his goodwill leading to the re-election in 2006 and the election of Dilma Rousseff in 2010. But soon it appeared that the old corruption monster of past governments was able to affect the Workers’ Party and scandals continued to emerge: in December 2007 the speaker of the Brazilian Senate and a key ally of President Lula, Renan Calheiros, resign in order to avoid an imminent impeachment hearing; in September 2008 President Lula suspends intelligence chiefs amid allegations their agencies spied on officials, politicians and judges; in June 2011 President Rousseff’s chief of staff resigns amid corruption allegations.
Whether it will be still the Workers’ Party to address this series of issues, with the aim of completing its programme with more attention to the needs of the population or it will be a change with Marina Silva and a sort of step back to a more liberal and capitalist strategy, one fact is clear: Brazil is a superpower in his childhood, and exactly like a child the good discipline imparted cannot be forgotten and must be used to build the next step of development.
Argentina: A Spectacular Recovery Can Survive on Political Nationalism?
Argentina, exactly like Brazil, after the dark age of a brutal dictatorship, the Falkland’s/Malvinas War and the years of uncontrolled corruption, assisted to a long period of exceptional growth. Although there are unresolved social issues and rising discontent within the poorest population, the achievement of Argentina’s economy have been even more remarkable if we take into account the crash of 2001-2002 which left a scar still visible today in the whole infrastructure that appear vulnerable and politically unstable.
However, unlike Brazil, Argentina turn to progressive leftist policies was not an obvious one or piloted by a proper socialist party, instead was the progressive wing of the Peronist party that emerged as victorious. Due to the strong critic against US policy and pursuing soon a policy mixed of nationalism and veiled socialist views, the Kirchners (Nestor and Cristina Fernandez) were able to rebuild the economy, obtaining strong popular support. Especially in recent years the government of Cristina Fernandez resorted even more to a strong and aggressive policy: justice for the criminals of the Dirty War, renewed claims on the Falklands/Malvinas and a new wave of nationalizations, aimed at secure popular support although critics points to the fact that this is just a diversion to mask the economic troubles that led to a new recent financial crisis.
Argentina benefits from rich natural resources, a highly educated population, a globally competitive agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. The country is one of South America’s largest economies although it has also fallen prey to a boom and bust cycle. The modern history of Argentina’s economy started In 1999, when Fernando de la Rua, of the centre-left Alianza opposition coalition, won the presidency thus inheriting 114 billion-dollar public debt. In order to restructure the economy de la Rua accepted the IMF policies of austerity and an aid package for nearly 40 billion dollars. The harsh austerity measures provoked a mass unrest and strikes forcing de la Rua to form a government of national unity in July 2001 and appointing three finance ministers in as many weeks as cabinet resignations and protests continued. While the country’s credit rating started to slip, President de la Rua met US President George W Bush in a last-ditch attempt to avoid an economic crash in Argentina. By December 2001 Economy Minister Cavallo announced stronger restrictions to halt an exodus of bank deposits while the IMF stopped $1.3bn in aid. The news sparked violent riots during which 25 people died in street protests forcing on 20 December President Fernando de la Rua to resign. The appointments of Adolfo Rodriguez Saa first and Peronist Senator Eduardo Duhalde as president in January 2002 could not avoid the collapse: within days the government devalued the peso, ending 10 years of parity with the US dollar, banking and foreign exchange activity were suspended. In November 2002 Argentina defaulted on an $800m debt repayment to the World Bank, having failed to re-secure an IMF aid. The new elections called by Duhalde for March 2003, later put back to April, to try in winning public support for the government’s handling of the economic crisis in reality put an end of it opening a new era in Argentina’s history.
In May 2003 Nestor Kirchner is sworn in as president after former President Carlos Menem, who gained most votes in the first round of elections, pulled out before the second round. During Kirchner’s presidency a recovery was well under way, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to a vital new loan. Since then, Argentina has restructured its massive debt, offering creditors new bonds for the defaulted ones, and has repaid its debt to the IMF.
Between 2003 and 2012, GDP doubled, with an average annual economic growth rate close to 7.2 percent, which constituted the highest average growth rate achieved in the country’s economic history for such a long period. More importantly, this unparalleled economic growth was socially inclusive, reflected in a clear reduction in poverty, unemployment, and inequality, making Argentina’s GDP per capita one of the highest in Latin America. Since 2003, key components of Argentina’s growth model were the creation of quality jobs, the progressive reduction of inequality, social inclusion and better income distribution. During this period, 500,000 new jobs were created each year, and unemployment thus was reduced from 18 percent in 2002 to 6.9 percent in 2012. The minimum wage grew to be the largest in Latin America. In turn, the average real wage increased by more than 37 percent. The end-result was a historic increase in living standards, which is reflected in the doubling of the middle-class between 2003 and 2009, as found by a report by the World Bank, only 24 percent of the population in 2003 against 46% in 2009.
The economic boost was mainly due to a more flexible exchange rate regime, a sustained global and regional growth, a boost in monetary, fiscal and income distribution policies, and a favorable international commodity prices. The economic recovery enabled the government to accumulate substantial official reserves, over $51 billion as of late August 2010. Poverty dropped to 12% in 2010 from the record high of over 50% in 2001-2002. Foreign trade played an increasingly important role in Argentina’s economic development, and key export markets included Brazil, EU, China, U.S. and Chile. The production of grains, cattle, and other agricultural goods continues to be the backbone of Argentina’s export economy while high-technology goods and services are emerging as significant export sectors.
This was the extraordinary period of growth that coincided with Nestor Kirchner presidency and his wife Cristina Fernandez at least until his death in 2010. The extraordinary economic results gave huge support to the presidents along with some of the internal policies such as the strong commitment to make justice for the Dirty War years crimes by imprisoning those responsible. Tens of thousands of people were killed by the military junta between 1976 and 1983; the bodies of many abductees (known as the desaparecidos “disappeared” ) have never been found, although forensic work continues to recover them. Amnesties which protected former junta members from prosecution (established during Carlos Menem presidency) were repealed in 2003 and the pardons granted to military leaders overturned in 2005. Soon followed the trials and the sentences: in October 2007 former Roman Catholic police chaplain Christian Von Wernich is convicted of collaborating in the murder and torture of prisoners; in August 2008 two former generals are sentenced to life imprisonment for their actions; former military ruler General Jorge Videla is sentenced to life in prison for crimes against humanity; former naval officer Alfredo Astiz and 11 other former members of the security forces are given life sentences for crimes against humanity; in July 2012 two former junta leaders were found guilty of overseeing the systematic theft of babies from political prisoners during 1976-1983 dictatorship: Jorge Videla and Reynaldo Bignone were sentenced to 50 and 15 years in prison respectively.
Although world economic entered a period of crisis in 2008, Argentina managed to stay afloat continuing its economic growth and ensuring to Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, succeeded to her husband in 2007, a comfortable presidency. The trend is also confirmed when, following the death in October 2010 of the ex-President Nestor Kirchner and seen as likely to come back into power in 2011 elections, President Cristina Fernandez Kirchner wins a second term with a landslide 54% of the vote mainly thanks to the economic successes. But her second term is also the most controversial one and lead to the present new economic crisis, thus for many opening a second phase for Argentina.
After a 9.2 percent growth rate in 2010, and 8.9 percent in 2011, in 2012 the economy only grew by 1.9 percent in a context of a persistent drought that impacted heavily on agricultural output. Strong economic activity recovered in 2013 but the global financial turmoil and rapid declines in world commodity prices started to impact Argentina’s market. While the economic downturn was less severe in Argentina than elsewhere, the deterioration of both domestic and international demand complicated the fiscal situations of both the federal government and the provinces. Nevertheless, was still the financial sphere that causes apprehension, due to Argentine arrears to international creditors and a large number of arbitration claims filed by foreign companies that remain to be resolved. Outstanding external debts included over $6.3 billion owed to official creditors according to Government of Argentina statistics, including about $500 million owed to the United States. By July 2014 Argentina made a final attempt to reach a deal with a group of US creditors to avoid a possible default on its debt, but a US federal judge did not allow the country to make a scheduled payment to bond holders unless it paid the creditors as well. This opened to the current financial crisis although many point at other economic indicators that put Cristina Fernandez under accusations of mismanagement.
By 2014 the government was struggling with high inflation, slow economic growth, falling central bank reserves and weak exports to key markets such Brazil. Argentina’s economy slipped into contraction in the January to March quarter for the first time in nearly two years with consumer prices rising by 12.9 percent, while international reserves shrank by 25 percent. Argentina’s has been accused of masking economic results to avoid international pressure and keep internal support. The inflation rate was estimated by many private-sector economists to be around 30% a year, consumer prices were rising by about 25 percent annually, while the peso currency’s black market rate was 48 percent weaker than the official rate. After several years of publishing non-credible statistics, Argentina’s official statistics agency (INDEC) released substantially revised inflation and GDP growth data that are closer in line with private estimates. The IMF had formally censured Argentina in February 2013 because of manipulation of inflation and GDP data, the first act of this kind in financial history.
Nevertheless, Cristina Fernandez managed to stay in power and keep support mainly due to a policy of political nationalism and economic nationalization, turning more to the left to appease popular demands. Argentina remains locked in a territorial dispute with Britain over the Falklands Islands, which are governed as a British overseas territory, but have been claimed by Buenos Aires since the 1830s as Las Malvinas. The issue led to war in 1982, when the islands fell to an invasion launched by Argentina’s military junta, but were re-conquered by Britain in a conflict that caused hundreds of deaths on both sides. Cristina Fernandez supported renewed claims over Las Malvinas by handing documents to UN formally laying claim to a vast expanse of the ocean, as far as the Antarctic and including island chains governed by Britain; imposing new controls on ships passing through its waters to Falklands Islands and even persuaded members of the South American trading bloc Mercosur to close their ports to ships flying the Falkland Islands flag during the 30th anniversary of the war. In March 2013 Falkland Islanders vote overwhelmingly in favour of remaining a British overseas territory but Argentina described the referendum as pointless. Parallel to this political nationalism, Kirchner proceed in a nationalization plan that hit energy company YPF, which was majority owned by Spain’s Repsol. In November 2013, President Fernandez appoints left wingers to run the cabinet of economy, agriculture and central bank in a move to strengthen state intervention.
All the above moves aimed at uniting the traditional nationalism of the peronist party by pursuing Las Malvinas claims and increase economic state interventionism to please the left radicals ensured to Cristina Fernandez a majority in the congress even when she has lost control on some provinces in the last elections. Playing Las Malvinas card is always a sure bet as the majority of Argentineans still consider this a post-colonial issue, and also put Argentina in the forefront of those countries that in South America strongly oppose the arrogance of the main powers such US or UK. Using interventionism in economy, pleased some of the radicals within the party as well as opening to a cooperation with left sectors that will connect the president with the popular strata more inclined to support social policies.
Whether Argentina will be able to achieve resilience in economy and put behind the traumas of the financial crashes it will depend on how effectively the government will be able to play its cards without bluffing: the result could backfire leaving more arguments to the opposition rather than the supporters.
Trying to keep under a “political control” the proximity area is not only a Russian prerogative, and it is what usually great powers have exercised over centuries to guarantee their own security. Russia’s looking after the ex soviet republic has for decades found its parallel in the American “back garden policy” towards Latin America which found its roots in the famous Monroe Doctrine. The subcontinent for decades has been put under the iron fist of Washington with the main task of counterbalancing the rising of socialism and the possible contagion from Cuba. However, if this policy gave its fruit and was pursued steadily during the Cold War, since the collapse of Soviet Union the US started to lose their grip as Russia started to lose its own on the east.
The last 20 years have seen great changes in Latin America, shaping the terrain for future development and at the same time brining into the 21st century continuity with the remnants of the past. Where it is heading today Latin America and what signals gave in the past two decades?
Latin America after having witnessed some of the most brutal dictatorships during the Cold War period started to develop finally its own road towards an “autonomous democracy” although not solving completely the problems inherited from the past (colonial and post independence). The Cold War inevitably put the subcontinent under the American radar in trying to eradicate any repetition of the Cuban experiment or, to use a word from Che Guevara, any “foco” able to develop in a new revolution Cuban style or to a socialist turn like in Chile. Dictatorships were appeased and even favored in some of the hot spots of leftist insurgence and radical political groups: Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia just to name some. Where dictatorship never arrived to repress the political shift, a counter revolution or a civil war was used, such in Nicaragua, to counter the Sandinistas or fomenting repression in Guatemala and El Salvador. Exactly like the Soviet Union, the US controlled its neighbors blocking any attempt to a political progress considered less favorable. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War suddenly exposed the US policy towards the subcontinent as obsolete and counterproductive, leading to a U-turn towards what can be described a disinterested or a sort of self accomplished security, thus paving the way for a more autonomous policy by the Latin American countries.
Latin America, free from the heavy guard of Washington, started to develop its own political choices as well as facing its unresolved problems, and developed interesting factors in international politics. Latin America is a land in rapid economic progress but is also full of contradictions and paradoxes, the recent Fifa World Cup in Brazil exposed to the world what the subcontinent is: potentially rich but marred by violence and civil unrest due to poverty, inequality, corruption, and police brutality. Latin America today offers some interesting points of discussion that we can identify under an economic, political and institutional field. On the economic field the subcontinent struggles between rapid growth and the inequality and poverty that destroy the dreams for the population such in Brazil or with economies oscillating from grow to sudden crashes like in Argentina. On the political field, since 1990 we assisted to a revival of Marxism both under a revolutionary strategy like in Chiapas, Venezuela and Bolivia or passing for milder turns like in Brazil, Uruguay and even Nicaragua where even ex guerrilla fighters started their own conversion from radicalism to reformism. Last, and not least, the institutional collapse of some of the fragile states in Latin America is better represented by the struggle of Mexico against its own drug cartels or the never ending Colombian guerrilla legacy which still leave the government under a constant threat.
Politics is a science and often is described as an art, but generally cannot escape the harsh and crude judgement that reality and history, through facts, expose in front of us.
We can debate on how we arrive to certain conclusions and how a fact unfolded, but that will not change the fact itself in being established. Exactly like maths, the result is not under question and two plus two is four, no question about.
The equation Ob stays to Ne as Pu stays to Ua is a scientific proof that politics can run along double standards and even hypocrisy but also that will not change the crude reality of the actual situation, whether we like or not. We can still refuse to accept the result but that does not change the fact.
What the equation stands for? It stands for the actual international scenario, where in face of the double standards, censorship and propaganda from the west and the east, there is a convergence of result and responsibilities. Obama stays at Netanyahu as Putin stays at Ukraine. This is a crude and real fact, both part of the equation explain the same result: power, nationalism, strategic interest. In one word forget humanitarian concerns.
Gaza and Ukraine are the face of the same medal but Western and Russian propaganda are trying to demonstrate the contrary. Everything has been said about the Ukrainian crisis, but the latest developments following the Malaysian plane disaster are the example of how to use a tragedy for strategic interests. No one really is thinking of the victims, but only how to exploit this to further escalate a tension with Russia. The whole archetype of the western democracy and judicial system is the presumption of innocence until a free trial and evidence is found. But what about the Ukrainian disaster? Official accusations to Russia are moved everyday by US and UK governments based on supposition, ideas, satellite images never shown, telephone interception never verified. On the other side, Russia is playing the same game, claiming Ukrainian responsibility but also without bringing a shred of proof. Although, it is legitimate to speculate and even advance hypothesis to the causes of the disaster and, based on facts, hazard an explanation, from speculation to actually build sanctions and international condemnation is a big jump ahead.
Going back to our initial question then, what makes different Ukraine from Israel? Where are the same indignation and disgust for the civilians killed in indiscriminate Israeli raids? If the same amount or even a 1/3 of all victims were caused by Putin or Yanukovich, we were probably already sending troops to fight in Ukraine. What makes this unhappy child, that is Israel, being continually immune from criticism and repercussions?
The support that Israel receives, not only militarily but also on a diplomatic level is such that if Netanyahu is responsible of war crimes, then are also his sponsors such US and UK. Exactly like they consider Putin the mastermind behind Ukraine, then you cannot deny Obama and US administration responsibility for the total impunity on how Israel conducts its criminal war in Palestine, Gaza, including past wars.
So, an objective analysis is still possible? Can we escape the brainwashing of our media, like the BBC putting Ukraine plane disaster on top of the news whilst Gaza is discussed like an appendix, an unfortunate situation to try to play down, to ignore the civilian dead by their fault because being there and not because of a military attack from Israel?
Israel has the right to defend itself. How many times we heard this sentence, and it has been as long as the dispute itself. Of course we know that every country has a right to defence but Israel is a state that signed international conventions, including for human rights, and cannot use this as a pretext to bombard indiscriminately all the Gaza strip. The IDF is now fighting these endless wars for over 50 years, and still they pretend to tell us that they do not know that due to Gaza’s high population density civilian victims are likely to happen. Hamas is a terrorist organisation, although now trying to transform itself in a political group, and its launch of missiles indiscriminately against innocent Israeli civilians is a crime, but this does not justify Israel to kill in the same way innocent people. Hospitals, schools, UN buildings, houses are these all Hamas nests? Even if Hamas is using human shields as Israel claims, and they are aware of, does this legitimate you to kill innocents anyway? Hamas is a terrorist group, but for a state to be classed as terrorist is ten times worst and this what Israel has become.
The unhappy child, like North Korea is for China with its tantrums, is the best way to expose the western double standards.
What about the Ukrainian plane disaster? Let’s start from the basics assumptions.
Ukrainian responsibility can be considered in two ways: a fighter jet shoot down the plane or a surface to air missile hit MH17. An objective analysis will says: If a fighter jet shoots down a civilian plane by mistake, then it means that it was trying to hit another plane, but rebels for what we know do not have an air force. Same apply to the missile theory, if they shot down the plane than the target could only have been another fighter jet, but rebel do not have an air force. Therefore this opens a further speculation: was it in response of a violation of the Ukrainian air space by Russian planes?
Rebels responsibility, once established that they do not have an air force, can only be considered under the use of surface to air missiles such the famous BUK. This also means that they were likely trying to shoot down a Ukrainian fighter jet, and clearly making a huge mistake.
Thus this opens other questions? How the rebels managed to obtain such sophisticated system, was from Russia or was stolen from Ukrainian hardware? If a Ukrainian fighter jet was flying nearer MH17, why this was happening? Why civilian flights have been allowed over Eastern Ukraine air space and over a conflict zone? It has been said that above 10,000 km flights would have been considered safe, but nobody was aware of any BUK missile deployed in the area? Where was the intelligence from US when they were able to spot three tanks entering from the Russian border but failed to spot a BUK missile system being deployed or supplied by Russia?
At last Russia, can it be held responsible? Obviously, but first should be established whether a BUK missile system has been supplied to rebels, or a fighter jest crossed over Ukraine airspace or they have fired themselves against the civilian plane.
Nevertheless, all the above are only speculations and may be total rubbish, unless actual proof is given, but from speculation to actually start officially accusing someone is again a big jump into the unknown.
To go back to our equation then Putin still stays at Ukraine, because exactly like the US, Russia uses strategic interest and goals to weaken the enemy presence and the plane incident, like the Gaza war, are at the eyes of the masters unfortunate episodes that they try to cover as much as they can or to explain differences. Their luck is that media are biased in Washington and London as in Moscow and they brainwash easily their audience; their misfortune is that where media freedom is blinded by nationalistic views, everyone using their own judgement can escape the mainstream media and search for the truth or the fact independently.
Unfortunately for all of us, and especially for the Gaza and the plane victims, big powers do not have long memory and focus, exactly like a child they have a short time span focus and so they easily change their attention as soon as a new front is open: that happened to Mali, Iraq and Isis, North Korea, Central African Republic, Nigeria and Boko Haram, Kenya, Al Shabab, etc.
Maths is not an opinion is a fact, war crimes are also facts, but justice unfortunately is becoming a mere opinion.